myblog

Share what's interesting to youLa situación política en Estados Unidos sigue confusa y complicada. Observadores políticos opinan que los republicanos respaldados por un movimiento ultraconservador, es probable que dominen el debate en la Cámara de Representantes esta semana, tratando de impulsar un plan de reducción de gastos que tiene escasas posibilidades de ser aprobado en alguna de las cámaras legislativas aun cuando existe el riesgo de que Estados Unidos incumpla el pago de su deuda.

CHRISTINGLE MASS 2009

Photos of our 4:30pm Christingle Mass (and sundry others) taken Christmas Eve 2009, and courtesy of Michael Bruner (not the sundrys...only the great shots!)

Apologies for the photo order...VOX doesn't always cooperate.

 

CH XMAS 09 020

PAGEANT 2009!

With gratitude for Director Suzanne Holder, Sunday School Director Cassandra Kirby, and behind the scenes workers Ruth Shankwiler and June Stadtler...and, of course, to our beautiful kids! Best photos by Michael Bruner, the rest blame on Woodward.

 

FEBRUARY 2010 Guided Trips to El Salvador with CRISTOSAL

Cristosal Foundation

Tenth Anniversary Celebration

in El Salvador

 

February 19 to March 1, 2010

 

Dear Friends:

 

You are invited to participate in this trip to El Salvador which promises to be an especially rewarding experience.  For many, this will be a first time trip, but for others a repeated experience.  Partly pilgrimage, mission trip, and cultural encounter, our time among the people of El Salvador, and supporting the work of the Anglican/Episcopal Church there, will change your view of life in North America and your perceptions about the church’s role in the world.

 

You are encouraged to make your own travel arrangements to El Salvador on Friday, February 19, 2010.  You will be met at the airport by representatives of Cristosal and/or the Anglican Church of El Salvador (La Iglesia Anglicana/Episcopal de El Salvador - IAES) and transported 30 minutes to the Hotel Alameda.

 

Our time in El Salvador will be shared with others from various parts of North America who will be present for the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Cristosal Foundation.  More on this later…

 

 

Itinerary

 

Saturday (February 20) will be a day for settling in and orientation.  Opportunity will be available to go as a group in the afternoon to visit the tomb of Archbishop Oscar Romero.  On Saturday evening, we will enjoy our first in-country meal of Salvadoran papusas.

 

On Sunday we will attend church at La Iglesia de San Juan Evangelista.  The priest there, Rev. Luis Serrano, is a Spanish born priest who has lived and served in Central America since the early 1970s.  During the civil war in El Salvador, he was imprisoned as a suspected guerrilla collaborator.  In fact, he was arrested for bringing rice and beans to the 1,000+ war refugees who were sheltering within the walled compound surrounding the church.  The former primate of the Anglican Church of Canada, Michael Peers, and former presiding bishop of ECUSA, Edmond Browning, visited Padre Serrano several times during his imprisonment.  Padre Serrano speaks English and is a proficient artist as we will see on numerous occasions at newer churches throughout the diocese.

 

From Monday until Thursday (February 22-25), participants will have a choice of three activity options:

 

Religio-Cultural Option :  Participants in this option will be introduced to the cultural history of El Salvador, go to places of religious significance such as the University of Central America where six Jesuit priests were assassinated on November 16, 1989 (almost exactly twenty years ago), celebrate mass with the inmates at the prison in the city of San Miguel, go to the Museum of the Revolution (Museo de la Revolución) located in the town of Perquin in the eastern part of the country, and make a pilgrimage to the former community of El Mozote where 1,000 people were massacred over a three day period in December of 1981.  We will also visit some Anglican parishes to experience the social development work being accomplished.

 

Economic Option : Participants in this option will come to a better understanding of the agricultural practices that El Salvador has experienced since the arrival of Europeans in the 16^th century.  There will be a visit to a coffee plantation and an opportunity to see how coffee is processed for export.  A significant part of the country’s income is derived from textile manufacturing plants (maquilas).  We will have a chance to visit one of these factories.  The diocese has developed means to foster income among the rural peasants campesinos) living in outlying parishes, and we will observe some of these projects personally.

 

Ecological Option :  Coffee plantations throughout El Salvador are linked by green belts to ensure habitat and migratory routes for indigenous wildlife.  Unfortunately, centuries of exploitation of the land has resulted in a devastated ecosystem.  Those who choose the ecological option will be exposed to the realities that have resulted: risk of mudslides due to erosion, as well as depleted and contaminated soil.  We will take a boat tour of a mangrove swamp where shrimp are reared and harvested.  El Salvador has five active volcanoes, and we will visit El Parque Nacional Los Volcanes to climb the Izalco Volcano.

 

Each of these options will include at least one night away from the Hotel Alameda.  It will be necessary to vacate your room at the hotel for this period.

 

Friday (February 26) will be a free day.  Two organized electives will be available: shopping or the beach.  The currency in El Salvador is the U.S. dollar.  Although the cost of living is relatively high in El Salvador, a number of handcrafted items can be obtained at reasonable prices.  With regard to the beaches, El Salvador is a world-renowned destination for surfing.  The coast is beautiful (and quite a bit more humid than the city of San Salvador at an altitude of 684 meters), with black volcanic sand, and places available to rent surfboards or purchase inexpensive boogie boards.  On this day, you will be responsible for your own lunch and dinner.

 

 

Tenth Anniversary Celebration

 

The weekend of February 27-28 is designated a commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the Cristosal Foundation (Fundación Cristosal).  This organization, based in Vermont, serves, supports and accompanies the Anglican Church’s work in El Salvador.  On Saturday, there will be a forum that will involve interaction between local agencies and North American visitors on a theme acknowledging the value of international volunteerism.  The Office of the President of the Republic, Mauricio Funes, has been contacted in the hope that the president will be available to address us.

 

On Saturday evening there will be a celebratory banquet.  On Sunday morning, we will travel to the western part of the country to a diocesan development called El Maizal.  There we will enjoy a festive eucharist and the dedication of monument erected in gratitude to those who have served the church as volunteers.  An al fresco lunch and soccer tournament will follow.  Tours of El Maizal and the opportunity to visit private homes will be available.

 

On Sunday evening we will return to the Hotel Alameda in San Salvador in preparation for departure on Monday, March 1.

 

 

Accommodations

 

The Hotel Alameda is a secure, modest, clean hotel in the heart of the capital city of El Salvador.  It boasts such amenities as electricity, hot and cold running water, and a well-maintained swimming pool.  The staff is very attentive to the needs of guests.  During our time at the Hotel Alameda, breakfast and most dinners will be provided there. The hotel is within walking distance (in groups) to the Diocesan Centre (Centro Diocesano), the pro cathedral Church of St. John the Evangelist (La Iglesia de San Juan Evangelista), MetroCentro which is the largest and most modern shopping mall in Central America, and via the central market to the Roman Catholic Metropolitan Cathedral which contains the tomb of Archbishop Oscar Romero.  The year 2010 marks the 30^th anniversary of Romero’s death.

 

 

In Preparation

 

The cost of the trip will be $1,495 (U.S.) plus airfare.  This includes accommodation at the Hotel Alameda on the nights of February 19-28 (based on double occupancy; single rooms available at a moderate additional cost.  Please inquire with Kevin Dixon if – at additional cost - you would prefer to stay at the nearby, 5 star Hotel InterContinental).  Also, most meals and transportation within El Salvador are included in this price.

 

Registration deadline is January 15, 2010 with a non-refundable deposit of $500, payable to Cristosal Foundation, due at that time. 

 

Good general health is required for this trip.  While there is no maximum age limit, you should be prepared for some long days, extended bus journeys, lengthy walks and hikes over rough, hilly terrain. The weather will be hot and dry during February.   Please inquire with your physician or other qualified medical practitioner regarding necessary immunizations and other health precautions that may be advisable. 

 

You must have a valid passport to travel to El Salvador.  Be certain that your passport expiry date is no sooner than September 1, 2010.  You will be charged for a tourist visa (less than $20) upon arrival at the airport in El Salvador.

 

For more information about the history, culture and economics of El Salvador, visit the website of the CIA World Factbook at www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/es.html or the Canadian Foreign Affairs website at www.voyage.gc.ca .  The Cristosal website is www.cristosal.org .

 

 

Recent mudslides in El Salvador

 

At least 150 people have died and dozens are missing after heavy rains triggered flooding and mudslides that buried communities Sunday, November 8, 2009 and left a swath of destruction in El Salvador. Another 13,680 people went to emergency shelters.  Laura Mata, communications manager for World Vision in El Salvador, said 40 percent of the dead are children.  The most affected departments are San Salvador, La Paz, Cuscatlan, Usulatan and San Vicente. San Vicente is the most heavily affected.  The El Salvadoran government's web site states there were 108 landslides, 209 destroyed buildings and another 1,835 damaged ones. In all, 18 bridges were affected, it said.  Private, government and U.N. donations have all been promised, but the needs exceed supplies, with high demand for food, construction materials, plastic sheeting, medications and clothing.  Fumigation efforts were slated to begin Tuesday to reduce the chances of disease.

 

Excerpt from a recent email from Richard Bower, executive director of Cristosal: “I would like to share with you what IAES is doing in El Salvador, responding to the emergencies of housing, clothing and food for those whose neighborhoods have been destroyed by floods and mud slides.  Yesterday I sent $3,500.00 to Martin to be of help, from special donation we have received.  Episcopal Relief and Development sent $7,500, which seems a small amount for them.  The church is working  with other organizations to provide what is needed.  The church has taken on responsibility to help 1,563 families, which include 6,747 persons.  An inventory of families and needs was completed this past week.  Please keep Archbishop Martín and the church in your prayers. They are working very hard.”

 

 

For more information about this trip to El Salvador, please contact Rev. Kevin Dixon at kdixon@stmaryskerrisdale.ca or call (604) 261-4228.

 

Please mail your completed registration form, with a $500 U.S. deposit check payable to Cristosal Foundation to:

 

Cristosal Tenth Anniversary Celebration

c/o Rev. Kevin Dixon

2490 W. 37th Ave.

Vancouver, BC 

V6M 1P5

CANADA

MASS ON THE GRASS, Lacy Park, June 7th, 2009!

CA. SUPREME COURT: Episcopal Church Properties

1

Filed 1/5/09

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

)

)

) S155094

EPISCOPAL CHURCH CASES. ) Ct.App. 4/3

) G036096, G036408 &

) G036868

) Orange County

) JCCP No. 4392

___________________________________ )

In this case, a local church has disaffiliated itself from a larger, general

church with which it had been affiliated. Both the local church and the general

church claim ownership of the local church building and the property on which the

building stands. The parties have asked the courts of this state to resolve this

dispute. When secular courts are asked to resolve an internal church dispute over

property ownership, obvious dangers exist that the courts will become

impermissibly entangled with religion. Nevertheless, when called on to do so,

secular courts must resolve such disputes. We granted review primarily to decide

how the secular courts of this state should resolve disputes over church property.

State courts must not decide questions of religious doctrine; those are for

the church to resolve. Accordingly, if resolution of the property dispute involves a

doctrinal dispute, the court must defer to the position of the highest ecclesiastical

authority that has decided the doctrinal point. But to the extent the court can

resolve the property dispute without reference to church doctrine, it should use

what the United States Supreme Court has called the “neutral principles of law”

2

approach. (Jones v. Wolf (1979) 443 U.S. 595, 597.) The court should consider

sources such as the deeds to the property in dispute, the local church’s articles of

incorporation, the general church’s constitution, canons, and rules, and relevant

statutes, including statutes specifically concerning religious property, such as

Corporations Code section 9142.

Applying the neutral principles of law approach, we conclude that the

general church, not the local church, owns the property in question. Although the

deeds to the property have long been in the name of the local church, that church

agreed from the beginning of its existence to be part of the greater church and to

be bound by its governing documents. These governing documents make clear

that church property is held in trust for the general church and may be controlled

by the local church only so long as that local church remains a part of the general

church. When it disaffiliated from the general church, the local church did not

have the right to take the church property with it.

We must also resolve the preliminary procedural question of whether this

action is subject to a special motion to dismiss under Code of Civil Procedure

section 425.16 — generally called an “anti-SLAPP motion.” 1 We conclude that

this action is not subject to an anti-SLAPP motion. Although protected activity

arguably lurks in the background of this case, the actual dispute concerns property

ownership rather than any such protected activity. Accordingly, this action is not

one “arising from” protected activity within the meaning of Code of Civil

Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1). Hence, that provision does not

apply.

1 The acronym “SLAPP” stands for “strategic lawsuit against public

participation.” (See Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29

Cal.4th 53, 57 & fn. 1.)

3

We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which reached the same

conclusions, although not always for the same reasons.

I. F ACTS AND P ROCEDURAL H ISTORY

“The Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America . . . ,

organized in 1789, was the product of secession of the Anglican church in the

colonies from the Church of England, the latter church itself being the product of

secession from the Church of Rome in 1534.” (Protestant Episcopal Church v.

Barker (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 599, 606.) The church (hereafter the Episcopal

Church) is governed by a general convention and a presiding bishop. In the

United States , the Episcopal Church is divided geographically into dioceses,

including the Episcopal Diocese of Los Angeles (Los Angeles Diocese). Each

diocese is governed by a diocesan convention and a bishop. A diocese is itself

divided into missions and parishes, which are individual churches where members

meet to worship. A parish is governed by a rector and a board of elected lay

persons called the vestry. (See Protestant Episcopal Church v. Barker, supra, at

pp. 606-607.) One such parish within the Los Angeles Diocese was St. James

Parish in Newport Beach (St. James Parish).

St. James Parish began as a mission of the Episcopal Church in 1946. In

1947, members of the mission sought permission from the Los Angeles Diocese to

organize as a parish. The members’ handwritten application “promise[d] and

declare[d] that the said Parish shall be forever held under, and conform to and be

bound by, the Ecclesiastical authority of the Bishop of Los Angeles, and of his

successor in office, the Constitution and Canons of the [Episcopal Church], and

the Constitution and Canons of the Diocese of Los Angeles.” Articles of

Incorporation of St. James Parish, filed with the California Secretary of State on

March 1, 1949, stated that the corporation was formed “[t]o establish and maintain

a Parish which shall form a constituent part of the Diocese of Los Angeles in [the

4

Episcopal Church]; and so that the Constitution and Canons, Rules, Regulations

and Discipline of said Church . . . and the Constitution and Canons in the Diocese

of Los Angeles, for the time being shall, unless they be contrary to the laws of this

State, always form a part of the By-Laws and Articles of Incorporation of the

corporation hereby formed and shall prevail against and govern anything herein

contained that may appear repugnant to such Constitutions, Canons, Rules,

Regulations and Discipline . . . .” In 1991, St. James Parish amended its articles of

incorporation, but it did not modify these provisions.

In 1950, the “Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Los Angeles”

deeded the property on which the church building stands to St. James Parish for

consideration of “less than $100.00.” The deeds to the property have been in the

name of the local church ever since.

Canon II.6 of the canons of the general convention of the Episcopal Church

provides: “Sec. 1. No Church or Chapel shall be consecrated until the Bishop

shall have been sufficiently satisfied that the building and the ground on which it

is erected are secured for ownership and use by a Parish, Mission, Congregation,

or Institution affiliated with this Church and subject to its Constitution and

Canons.

“Sec. 2. It shall not be lawful for any Vestry, Trustees, or other body

authorized by laws of any State or Territory to hold property for any Diocese,

Parish or Congregation, to encumber or alienate any dedicated and consecrated

Church or Chapel, or any Church or Chapel which has been used solely for Divine

Service, belonging to the Parish or Congregation which they represent, without the

previous consent of the Bishop, acting with the advice and consent of the Standing

Committee of the Diocese.

5

“Sec. 3. No dedicated and consecrated Church or Chapel shall be removed,

taken down, or otherwise disposed of for any worldly or common use, without the

previous consent of the Standing Committee of the Diocese.

“Sec. 4. Any dedicated and consecrated Church or Chapel shall be subject

to the trust declared with respect to real and personal property held by any Parish,

Mission, or Congregation as set forth in Canon I.7.4.”

The record shows, and no one disputes, that the Episcopal Church first

adopted the original versions of sections 2 and 3 of Canon II.6 in 1868. It added

section 1 of that Canon in 1871 and section 4 in 1979 when it amended Canon I.7.

In 1979, in apparent response to that year’s United States Supreme Court

opinion in Jones v. Wolf, supra, 443 U.S. 595, the Episcopal Church added section

4 to Canon I.7 (Canon I.7.4), which provides: “All real and personal property held

by or for the benefit of any Parish, Mission or Congregation is held in trust for this

Church and the Diocese thereof in which such Parish, Mission or Congregation is

located. The existence of this trust, however, shall in no way limit the power and

authority of the Parish, Mission or Congregation otherwise existing over such

property so long as the particular Parish, Mission or Congregation remains a part

of, and subject to, this Church and its Constitution and Canons.”

Recently, as a result of a doctrinal dispute, St. James Parish disaffiliated

itself from the Episcopal Church. It appears that the dispute leading to the

decision to disaffiliate arose after the national church ordained an openly gay man

as a bishop in New Hampshire in 2003. Some members of the Episcopal Church,

including members of St. James Parish, disagreed with this ordination. In July

2004, the board of St. James Parish voted to end its affiliation with the Episcopal

Church and to affiliate with the Anglican Church of Uganda. A majority of the

congregation voted to support the decision. After the disaffiliation, a further

dispute arose as to who owned the church building that St. James Parish used for

6

worship and the property on which the building stands — the local church that left

the Episcopal Church or the higher church authorities.

To resolve this dispute, the Los Angeles Diocese and various individuals,

including a dissenter from the decision by St. James Parish to disaffiliate

(hereafter collectively Los Angeles Diocese), sued various individuals connected

with St. James Parish (defendants) alleging eight property-recovery-related causes

of action. Later, the national Episcopal Church successfully sought to intervene

on the side of the Los Angeles Diocese and filed its own complaint in intervention

against defendants. In essence, both sides in this litigation, i.e., defendants on one

side, and the Los Angeles Diocese and Episcopal Church allied on the other side,

claim ownership of the local church building and property on which it stands.

The defendants moved to strike the Los Angeles Diocese’s lawsuit as a

SLAPP suit under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The trial court granted

the motion and dismissed the action without leave to amend, finding both that the

action was a SLAPP suit and that the plaintiffs had not established a probability

that they would prevail. The court later sustained without leave to amend

defendants’ demurrer to the Episcopal Church’s complaint in intervention and

dismissed that action. The Los Angeles Diocese and the Episcopal Church

appealed the dismissals. The Court of Appeal consolidated the appeals and

reversed the judgments. That court ruled that the action was not a SLAPP suit

subject to the special motion to strike, and that the higher church authorities, not

defendants, own the disputed property.

We granted review to decide both whether this action is subject to the

special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 and the

merits of the church property dispute.

7

II. D ISCUSSION

A. Special Motion to Strike Under Code of Civil Procedure Section

425.16

Before considering the merits of the property dispute, we must decide a

preliminary procedural question. Subdivision (b)(1) of Code of Civil Procedure

section 425.16 (section 425.16) provides: “A cause of action against a person

arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition

or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection

with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court

determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the

plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” Defendants filed a special motion to strike

under this section — a “so-called anti-SLAPP motion.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001)

24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131.) The trial court found that section 425.16 governs the

action the Los Angeles Diocese filed and, further finding the plaintiffs had not

shown a probability they would prevail, granted the special motion to strike. The

Court of Appeal concluded that the action was not a SLAPP suit. We agree with

the Court of Appeal.

“[S]ection 425.16 requires that a court engage in a two-step process when

determining whether a defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion should be granted. First,

the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the

challenged cause of action is one ‘arising from’ protected activity. (§ 425.16,

subd. (b)(1).) If the court finds such a showing has been made, it then must

consider whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the

claim.” (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 76.) Defendants argue

that this action arose from their protected activity in first expressing disagreement

with the higher church authorities regarding church governance and then

disaffiliating from the general church.

8

The Los Angeles Diocese’s complaint did allege facts concerning the

reasons defendants decided to disaffiliate from the greater church. Nevertheless,

we conclude the action did not arise from protected activity within the meaning of

section 425.16. As the Court of Appeal aptly stated, “The flaw in this thinking is

that it confuses the motivation for the disaffiliation with the claims made by the

general church about the use of church property. [¶] . . . [I]t makes no difference

why defendants are disaffiliating; the point is they are being sued for asserting

control over the local parish property to the exclusion of a right to control

asserted by plaintiffs .”

“[T]he mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place

does not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of the anti-

SLAPP statute. [Citation.] Moreover, that a cause of action arguably may have

been ‘triggered’ by protected activity does not entail that it is one arising from

such. [Citation.] In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical consideration is whether

the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected free speech or petitioning

activity.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89.) In filing this action, the

Los Angeles Diocese sought to resolve a property dispute. The property dispute is

based on the fact that both sides claim ownership of the same property. This

dispute, and not any protected activity, is “the gravamen or principal thrust” of the

action. (Martinez v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 193.)

The additional fact that protected activity may lurk in the background — and may

explain why the rift between the parties arose in the first place — does not

transform a property dispute into a SLAPP suit. Accordingly, the trial court erred

in treating this as a SLAPP suit subject to section 425.16’s special motion to

dismiss.

9

B. Resolving the Dispute Over the Church Property

Both lower courts also decided the merits of the dispute over ownership of

the local church — the trial court in favor of the local church and the Court of

Appeal in favor of the general church. We will also decide this question, which

the parties as well as various amici curiae have fully briefed. We will first

consider what method the secular courts of this state should use to resolve disputes

over church property. We will then apply that method to resolve the dispute of

this case.

1. How California Courts Should Resolve Disputes Over Church

Property

Decisions from both this court and the United States Supreme Court have

made clear that, when asked to do so, secular courts may, indeed must, resolve

internal church disputes over ownership of church property. As the high court put

it in the seminal 19th-century case involving a church property dispute, “an appeal

is made to the secular authority; the courts when so called on must perform their

functions as in other cases. [¶] Religious organizations come before us in the

same attitude as other voluntary associations for benevolent or charitable

purposes, and their rights of property, or of contract, are equally under the

protection of the law, and the actions of their members subject to its restraints.”

(Watson v. Jones (1871) 80 U.S. 679, 714.) Similarly, in its most recent decision

involving a church property dispute, the court stated, “There can be little doubt

about the general authority of civil courts to resolve this question. The State has

an obvious and legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes,

and in providing a civil forum where the ownership of church property can be

determined conclusively.” (Jones v. Wolf, supra, 443 U.S. at p. 602.) (For cases

from this court, see, e.g., Rosicrucian Fellow v. Rosicrucian Etc. Ch. (1952) 39

Cal.2d 121, 131; Wheelock v. First Presb. Church (1897) 119 Cal. 477, 482.)

10

But when called on to resolve church property disputes, secular courts must

not entangle themselves in disputes over church doctrine or infringe on the right to

free exercise of religion. In this regard, the United States Supreme Court has

made two points clear: (1) how state courts resolve church property disputes is a

matter of state law; but (2) the method a state chooses must not violate the First

Amendment to the United States Constitution. 2 “[T]he First Amendment prohibits

civil courts from resolving church property disputes on the basis of religious

doctrine and practice. [Citations.] As a corollary to this commandment, the

Amendment requires that civil courts defer to the resolution of issues of religious

doctrine or polity by the highest court of a hierarchical church organization.

[Citations.] Subject to these limitations, however, the First Amendment does not

dictate that a State must follow a particular method of resolving church property

disputes. Indeed, ‘a State may adopt any one of various approaches for settling

church property disputes so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal

matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith.’ ” (Jones

v. Wolf , supra, 443 U.S. at p. 602, quoting Md. & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Ch.

(1970) 396 U.S. 367, 368 (conc. opn. of Brennan, J.).)

The high court found invalid, for example, a method used in Georgia

whereby “the right to the property previously used by the local churches was made

to turn on a civil court jury decision as to whether the general church abandoned

or departed from the tenets of faith and practice it held at the time the local

churches affiliated with it.” (Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, supra, 393 U.S.

2 As relevant here, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution

(First Amendment) provides: “Congress shall make no law respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” (See

Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral (1952) 344 U.S. 94, 100, fn. 5.) Although the

amendment refers solely to Congress, its restraints apply to the states through the

Fourteenth Amendment. (See Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church (1969) 393

U.S. 440, 441.)

11

at p. 441.) The court held that “the civil courts [have] no role in determining

ecclesiastical questions in the process of resolving property disputes.” (Id. at p.

447.) It explained that the First Amendment “commands civil courts to decide

church property disputes without resolving underlying controversies over religious

doctrine. Hence, States, religious organizations, and individuals must structure

relationships involving church property so as not to require the civil courts to

resolve ecclesiastical questions.” (Id. at p. 449.) The court concluded that the

“departure-from-doctrine” approach “requires the civil court to determine matters

at the very core of a religion — the interpretation of particular church doctrines

and the importance of those doctrines to the religion. Plainly, the First

Amendment forbids civil courts from playing such a role.” (Id. at p. 450; see also

Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich (1976) 426 U.S. 696, 698 [“inquiries

made by the Illinois Supreme Court into matters of ecclesiastical cognizance and

polity and the court’s actions pursuant thereto contravened the First and

Fourteenth Amendments”].) The court remanded the matter to the Georgia

Supreme Court to develop a new method for resolving church property disputes.

(Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, supra, at pp. 450-452.)

The high court has approved two methods for adjudicating church property

disputes. The first approach is one the court itself adopted in the 19th century.

(Watson v. Jones, supra, 80 U.S. 679.) 3 This approach is often called the

“principle of government” approach. (See Watson v. Jones, supra, 80 U.S. at p.

725.) The Watson v. Jones court distinguished between two types of church

disputes. One “has reference to the case of a church of a strictly congregational or

3 As the high court later explained, Watson v. Jones, supra, 80 U.S. 679,

predated Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins (1938) 304 U.S. 64 and, accordingly, “it was

based on general federal law rather than the state law of the forum in which it was

brought.” (Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, supra, 426 U.S. at p. 710,

fn. 5.)

12

independent organization, governed solely within itself . . . ; and to property held

by such a church, either by way of purchase or donation, with no other specific

trust attached to it in the hands of the church than that it is for the use of that

congregation as a religious society.” (Id. at pp. 724-725.) “In such cases,” the

court explained, “where there is a schism which leads to a separation into distinct

and conflicting bodies, the rights of such bodies to the use of the property must be

determined by the ordinary principles which govern voluntary associations.” (Id.

at p. 725.) Another type, which the court said “is the one which is oftenest found

in the courts,” involves a hierarchical structure, i.e., a “religious congregation

which is itself part of a large and general organization of some religious

denomination, with which it is more or less intimately connected by religious

views and ecclesiastical government.” (Id. at p. 726.) In the latter case, the court

said, “we are bound to look at the fact that the local congregation is itself but a

member of a much larger and more important religious organization, and is under

its government and control, and is bound by its orders and judgments.” (Id. at pp.

726-727.)

The court adopted this test for a hierarchical church: “[W]henever the

questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been

decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been

carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on

them, in their application to the case before them.” (Watson v. Jones, supra, 80

U.S. at p. 727; see also Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, supra, 426 U.S.

at p. 710 [quoting this language and describing it as the rule applicable to

“hierarchical churches”].)

The second approach the high court has approved is what it called the

“neutral principles of law” approach. (Jones v. Wolf, supra, 443 U.S. at p. 597.)

The court first mentioned such a possible approach in Presbyterian Church v. Hull

13

Church , supra, 393 U.S. 440: “And there are neutral principles of law, developed

for use in all property disputes, which can be applied without ‘establishing’

churches to which property is awarded.” (Id. at p. 449.) A year later, in a brief

per curiam opinion, the high court upheld Maryland’s resolution of a church

property dispute that “relied upon provisions of state statutory law governing the

holding of property by religious corporations, upon language in the deeds

conveying the properties in question to the local church corporations, upon the

terms of the charters of the corporations, and upon provisions in the constitution of

the General Eldership pertinent to the ownership and control of church property.”

(Md. & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Ch., supra, 396 U.S. at p. 367, fn. omitted.) 4

Because this approach “involved no inquiry into religious doctrine,” the high court

dismissed the appeal as one involving no substantial federal question. (396 U.S. at

p. 368; see also id. at p. 370 (conc. opn. of Brennan, J.) [discussing the neutral

principles approach in greater detail].)

4 Although the high court originally referred to “neutral principles of law,

developed for use in all property disputes” (Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church,

supra , 393 U.S. at p. 449), it later made clear that such neutral principles may

include application of statutes specifically governing religious property. (Md. &

Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Ch. , supra, 396 U.S. at p. 367; see also id. at p. 370

(conc. opn. of Brennan, J.).) As the high court explained in Jones v. Wolf, supra,

443 U.S. at pages 602-603, “The neutral-principles approach was approved in

[Md. & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Ch., supra], an appeal from a judgment of

the Court of Appeals of Maryland settling a local church property dispute on the

basis of the language of the deeds, the terms of the local church charters, the state

statutes governing the holding of church property , and the provisions in the

constitution of the general church concerning the ownership and control of church

property.” (Italics added.)

A statute governing specifically church property obviously is not developed

for use in all property disputes, but, as the high court has made clear, it may still

be considered in applying neutral principles of law as that court defines the term.

Such a statute is — or must be — neutral in the sense that it does not require state

courts to resolve questions of religious doctrine.

14

The high court definitively approved the neutral principles approach in

Jones v. Wolf , supra, 443 U.S. 595, a 1979 decision that is the high court’s most

recent on this subject and, hence, is of critical importance to the instant dispute.

After that court had invalidated Georgia’s method for resolving church property

disputes (Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, supra, 393 U.S. 440), Georgia

adopted a new approach. The high court considered that new approach in Jones v.

Wolf , supra, 443 U.S. 595. It summarized the issue at the outset: “This case

involves a dispute over the ownership of church property following a schism in a

local church affiliated with a hierarchical church organization. The question for

decision is whether civil courts, consistent with the First and Fourteenth

Amendments to the Constitution, may resolve the dispute on the basis of ‘neutral

principles of law,’ or whether they must defer to the resolution of an authoritative

tribunal of the hierarchical church.” (Id. at p. 597.)

The high court reviewed three Georgia Supreme Court opinions that

postdated the remand in Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, supra, 393 U.S.

440. It explained that after the remand, the Georgia Supreme Court “adopted what

is now known as the ‘neutral principles of law’ method for resolving church

property disputes. The [Georgia Supreme Court] examined the deeds to the

properties, the state statutes dealing with implied trusts [citation], and the Book of

Church Order to determine whether there was any basis for a trust in favor of the

general church.” (Jones v. Wolf, supra, 443 U.S. at p. 600.) In all three of the

Georgia Supreme Court cases, the deeds to the disputed property were in the name

of the local church. In two of them, including the case the Jones v. Wolf court was

reviewing, no statute or church document created a trust in favor of the general

church. In those cases, the Georgia Supreme Court awarded the property to the

local church. (Id. at pp. 600-601.) In the third case, however, involving a dispute

within the United Methodist Church, the high court explained that the Georgia

15

Supreme Court “observed, however, that the constitution of The United Methodist

Church, its Book of Discipline, contained an express trust provision in favor of the

general church. On this basis, the church property was awarded to the

denominational church.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)

The Jones v. Wolf court upheld Georgia’s neutral principles approach,

although it remanded the particular case to the Georgia Supreme Court for further

proceedings on a narrow point irrelevant to the issue of this case. 5 It recognized

advantages inherent in that approach. “The primary advantages of the neutralprinciples

approach are that it is completely secular in operation, and yet flexible

enough to accommodate all forms of religious organization and polity. The

method relies exclusively on objective, well-established concepts of trust and

property law familiar to lawyers and judges. It thereby promises to free civil

courts completely from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and

practice. Furthermore, the neutral-principles analysis shares the peculiar genius of

private-law systems in general — flexibility in ordering private rights and

obligations to reflect the intentions of the parties. Through appropriate

reversionary clauses and trust provisions, religious societies can specify what is to

happen to church property in the event of a particular contingency, or what

religious body will determine the ownership in the event of a schism or doctrinal

5 The Georgia Supreme Court had also resolved a dispute over which of two

local factions properly represented the local church. The high court was

concerned that the Georgia Supreme Court had not adequately explained its

reasoning. Specifically, the Georgia Supreme Court did not explain whether it

simply applied majority rule — which the high court indicated would be

permissible — or whether the decision “involve[d] considerations of religious

doctrine and polity” — which the high court indicated would not be permissible.

(Jones v. Wolf, supra, 443 U.S. at p. 608.) The high court remanded the matter to

permit the Georgia Supreme Court to articulate the reasons it concluded one

particular faction represented the local church. (Id. at pp. 609-610.) This case

presents no such issue.

16

controversy. In this manner, a religious organization can ensure that a dispute

over the ownership of church property will be resolved in accord with the desires

of the members.” (Jones v. Wolf, supra, 443 U.S. at pp. 603-604.)

The court also recognized potential difficulties inherent in the neutral

principles approach. “The neutral-principles method, at least as it has evolved in

Georgia, requires a civil court to examine certain religious documents, such as a

church constitution, for language of trust in favor of the general church. In

undertaking such an examination, a civil court must take special care to scrutinize

the document in purely secular terms, and not to rely on religious precepts in

determining whether the document indicates that the parties have intended to

create a trust. In addition, there may be cases where the deed, the corporate

charter, or the constitution of the general church incorporates religious concepts in

the provisions relating to the ownership of property. If in such a case the

interpretation of the instruments of ownership would require the civil court to

resolve a religious controversy, then the court must defer to the resolution of the

doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body.” (Jones v. Wolf, supra,

443 U.S. at p. 604.)

Despite these potential difficulties, the high court concluded that “the

promise of nonentanglement and neutrality inherent in the neutral-principles

approach more than compensates for what will be occasional problems in

application. These problems, in addition, should be gradually eliminated as

recognition is given to the obligation of ‘States, religious organizations, and

individuals [to] structure relationships involving church property so as not to

require the civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions.’ [Citation.] We

therefore hold that a State is constitutionally entitled to adopt neutral principles of

law as a means of adjudicating a church property dispute.” (Jones v. Wolf, supra,

17

443 U.S. at p. 604, quoting Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, supra, 393 U.S.

at p. 449.)

Early cases from this court resolving church property disputes generally

cited Watson v. Jones, supra, 80 U.S. 679, the only then existing United States

Supreme Court decision on the subject. (See Rosicrucian Fellow v. Rosicrucian

Etc. Ch. , supra, 39 Cal.2d at p. 131; Committee of Missions v. Pacific Synod

(1909) 157 Cal. 105, 122; Horsman v. Allen (1900) 129 Cal. 131, 135; Wheelock

v. First Presb. Church , supra, 119 Cal. at p. 485; Baker v. Ducker (1889) 79 Cal.

365, 374.) This court has not had occasion to consider the neutral principles

approach in a church property case since its development. 6 The Courts of Appeal

have, however, adopted and consistently used it. (Concord Christian Center v.

Open Bible Standard Churches (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1411; California-

Nevada Annual Conf. of the United Methodist Church v. St. Luke’s United

Methodist Church (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 754, 762-764; Guardian Angel Polish

Nat. Catholic Church of L.A., Inc. v. Grotnik (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 919, 930;

Singh v. Singh (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1280-1281; Korean United

Presbyterian Church v. Presbytery of the Pacific (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 480, 497-

499, 503; Protestant Episcopal Church v. Barker, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p.

615; Presbytery of Riverside v. Community Church of Palm Springs (1979) 89

Cal.App.3d 910, 919-923 (Presbytery of Riverside); In re Metropolitan Baptist

6 In a case not involving a church property dispute, we described “the rule

that the state must accept the decision of appropriate church authorities on . . .

matters [of religious doctrine and internal church governance]” as “the rule of the

so-called church property cases.” (Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v.

Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 527, 541.) As Jones v. Wolf, supra, 443 U.S.

595, makes clear, this rule does indeed apply to church property cases even under

the neutral principles approach. Because no church property dispute existed in

Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court , we did not consider

whether neutral principles of law can be used to resolve such disputes.

18

Church of Richmond, Inc. (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 850, 858-859; see also

Metropolitan Philip v. Steiger (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 923, 929, fn. 7 [not deciding

whether the neutral principles approach is valid because the case turned on an

ecclesiastical dispute requiring the court to defer to the ecclesiastical authorities].)

The Court of Appeal in this case criticized these Court of Appeal decisions

for, in its view, violating principles of stare decisis. The Court of Appeal believed

that early cases of this court specifically adopted the principle of government

approach, thus precluding the more recent Courts of Appeal from adopting the

neutral principles approach. We disagree. As explained in the Court of Appeal

opinion containing the most thorough examination of this question (Presbytery of

Riverside, supra, 89 Cal.App.3d 910), the principle of government method of

Watson v. Jones , supra, 80 U.S. 679, and the neutral principles method of Jones v.

Wolf , supra, 443 U.S. 595, are not mutually exclusive, but can be reconciled. 7 In

any event, this court unquestionably has authority to adopt the neutral principles

approach.

Watson v. Jones , supra, 80 U.S. at page 727, held that secular courts must

accept as binding any church adjudication regarding “questions of discipline, or of

faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law . . . .” As Jones v. Wolf, supra, 443

U.S. 595, makes clear, this remains the rule. Secular courts may not decide

questions involving church doctrine or faith. But this rule does not prevent courts

from using neutral principles of law to resolve a church property dispute that does

not turn on questions of church doctrine: “However, when the dispute to be

resolved is essentially ownership or right to possession of property, the civil courts

7 The opinion of Presbytery of Riverside, supra, 89 Cal.App.3d 910, actually

predated Jones v. Wolf, supra, 443 U.S. 595, by a few months, but it considered

the discussion of “neutral principles of law” found in Presbyterian Church v. Hull

Church , supra, 393 U.S. 440. (Presbytery of Riverside, supra, at pp. 920-924 &

fn. 2.)

19

appropriately adjudicate the controversy even though it may arise out of a dispute

over doctrine or other ecclesiastical question, provided the court can resolve the

property dispute without attempting to resolve the underlying ecclesiastical

controversy.” (Presbytery of Riverside, supra, 89 Cal.App.3d at p. 920.) As the

Presbytery of Riverside court explained, “[i]n Watson v. Jones the court was asked

to decree the termination of an implied trust because of alleged departures from

doctrine by the general church. (See Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, supra,

393 U.S. at p. 445.) Thus the dispute involved in the case was purely

ecclesiastical.” (Id. at p. 921.)

The Presbytery of Riverside court also discussed early decisions of this

court and concluded that, although they cited and applied the rule of Watson v.

Jones , supra, 80 U.S. 679, they do not preclude use of neutral principles of law to

decide church property disputes that do not turn on questions of church doctrine.

(Presbytery of Riverside, supra, 89 Cal.App.3d at pp. 922-923.) As did the court

in Protestant Episcopal Church v. Barker, supra, 115 Cal.App.3d at page 614 (and

implicitly the more recent Court of Appeal decisions using the neutral principles

approach), we find the discussion in Presbytery of Riverside, supra, 89 Cal.App.3d

910, persuasive. Subject to the proviso that secular courts may not decide

questions of church doctrine, we believe that California courts should use neutral

principles of law to decide church property disputes.

Accordingly, we conclude that secular courts called on to resolve church

property disputes should proceed as follows: State courts must not decide

questions of religious doctrine; those are for the church to resolve. Accordingly, if

resolution of a property dispute involves a point of doctrine, the court must defer

to the position of the highest ecclesiastical authority that has decided the point.

But to the extent the court can resolve a property dispute without reference to

church doctrine, it should apply neutral principles of law. The court should

20

consider sources such as the deeds to the property in dispute, the local church’s

articles of incorporation, the general church’s constitution, canons, and rules, and

relevant statutes, including statutes specifically concerning religious property,

such as Corporations Code section 9142. (See Jones v. Wolf, supra, 443 U.S. at p.

600 [upholding Georgia’s use of such sources]; Md. & Va. Churches v.

Sharpsburg Ch. , supra, 396 U.S. 367 [upholding Maryland’s use of such sources];

Protestant Episcopal Church v. Barker , supra, 115 Cal.App.3d at p. 621.)

2. Resolving the Dispute of This Case

St. James Parish holds record title to the property in question. That is the

fact that defendants rely on most heavily in claiming ownership. On the other

hand, from the beginning of its existence, St. James Parish promised to be bound

by the constitution and canons of the Episcopal Church. Such commitment is

found in the original application to the higher church authorities to organize as a

parish and in the articles of incorporation. Canon I.7.4, adopted in 1979, provides

that property held by a local parish “is held in trust” for the general church and the

diocese in which the local church is located. The same canon states that the trust

does not limit the authority of the parish over the property “so long as the

particular Parish . . . remains a part of, and subject to, this Church and its

Constitution and Canons.” Other canons adopted long before St. James Parish

existed also contained substantial restrictions on the local use of church property.

The question before us is, which prevails — the fact that St. James Parish

holds record title to the property, or the facts that it is bound by the constitution

and canons of the Episcopal Church and the canons impress a trust in favor of the

general church? In deciding this question, we are not entirely free from

constitutional constraints. Once again, Jones v. Wolf, supra, 443 U.S. 595, is

important to this question. Although that decision permitted the states to use the

21

neutral principles approach, it also made clear that in applying that approach, state

courts must neither become entangled in religious matters nor, especially

important to the instant dispute, violate the First Amendment right to free exercise

of religion. Jones v. Wolf was a five-to-four decision, with the dissent arguing that

the First Amendment compels use of the principle-of-government approach of

Watson v. Jones , supra, 80 U.S. 679 — under which the higher church authorities

would necessarily win. Normally, the dissent would not be of great significance to

this court, because we are bound by the majority opinion concerning federal

constitutional questions. But the majority responded to some of the dissent’s

specific arguments. The dissent is important to give context and meaning to the

majority’s response.

The dissent argued that “in each case involving an intrachurch dispute —

including disputes over church property — the civil court must focus directly on

ascertaining, and then following, the decision made within the structure of church

governance. . . . [B]y recognizing the authoritative resolution reached within the

religious association, the civil court avoids interfering indirectly with the religious

governance of those who have formed the association and submitted themselves to

its authority.” (Jones v. Wolf, supra, 443 U.S. at p. 618, fn. omitted (dis. opn. of

Powell, J.).) The majority responded to this point, which it described as an

argument “that a rule of compulsory deference is necessary in order to protect the

free exercise rights ‘of those who have formed the association and submitted

themselves to its authority.’ ” (Jones v. Wolf, supra, at pp. 605-606.)

Significantly, the majority did not deny that free exercise rights require a secular

court to defer to decisions made within a religious association when local churches

have submitted themselves to the authority of that association. Rather, the

majority argued that the neutral principles approach is consistent with this

requirement.

22

The dissent’s argument, the Jones v. Wolf majority stated, “assumes that the

neutral-principles method would somehow frustrate the free-exercise rights of the

members of a religious association. Nothing could be further from the truth. The

neutral-principles approach cannot be said to ‘inhibit’ the free exercise of religion,

any more than do other neutral provisions of state law governing the manner in

which churches own property, hire employees, or purchase goods. Under the

neutral-principles approach, the outcome of a church property dispute is not

foreordained. At any time before the dispute erupts, the parties can ensure, if they

so desire, that the faction loyal to the hierarchical church will retain the church

property. They can modify the deeds or the corporate charter to include a right of

reversion or trust in favor of the general church. Alternatively, the constitution of

the general church can be made to recite an express trust in favor of the

denominational church . The burden involved in taking such steps will be

minimal. And the civil courts will be bound to give effect to the result indicated by

the parties , provided it is embodied in some legally cognizable form.” (Jones v.

Wolf , supra, 443 U.S. at p. 606, italics added.)

Shortly after this decision, and in apparent reaction to it, the Episcopal

Church added Canon I.7.4, which recites an express trust in favor of the

denominational church. This occurred some 25 years before the instant dispute

erupted. Defendants focus on the high court’s reference to what the “parties” can

do, and argue that Canon I.7.4, to be effective, had to have been enacted by the

parties — in other words, that some kind of agreement must have been reached

between the general church and St. James Parish (and presumably every other

parish in the country) ratifying Canon I.7.4. We do not so read the high court’s

words. Use of the passive voice in describing the possible “alternative[]” of

making the general church’s constitution recite the trust suggests the high court

intended that this could be done by whatever method the church structure

23

contemplated. Requiring a particular method to change a church’s constitution —

such as requiring every parish in the country to ratify the change — would infringe

on the free exercise rights of religious associations to govern themselves as they

see fit. It would impose a major, not a “minimal,” burden on the church

governance. (Jones v. Wolf, supra, 443 U.S. at p. 606.)

Thus, the high court’s discussion in Jones v. Wolf, supra, 443 U.S. at page

606, together with the Episcopal Church’s adoption of Canon I.7.4 in response,

strongly supports the conclusion that, once defendants left the general church, the

property reverted to the general church. Moreover, Canon I.7.4 is consistent with

earlier-enacted canons that, although not using the word “trust,” impose

substantial limitations on the local parish’s use of church property and give the

higher church authorities substantial authority over that property. For example,

permitting a disaffiliating local church to take the property with it when it

reaffiliates with a different church is inconsistent with the prohibition of Canon

II.6, section 2, against encumbering or alienating local property without the

previous consent of higher church authorities. Thus, a strong argument exists that

Canon I.7.4 merely codified what had long been implicit. As we discuss below,

this is the conclusion reached by some of the out-of-state decisions that awarded

property to the national Episcopal Church in similar disputes.

A California statutory provision that was enacted shortly after Jones v.

Wolf , supra, 443 U.S. 595, and that is consistent with the language quoted above

from page 606 of that decision, also supports the conclusion that the property now

belongs to the general church. As relevant, subdivisions (c) and (d) of

Corporations Code section 9142 (section 9142), which were enacted in 1982

(Stats. 1982, ch. 242, § 1, p. 784), provide:

24

“(c) No assets of a religious corporation are or shall be deemed to be

impressed with any trust, express or implied, statutory or at common law unless

one of the following applies: [¶] . . .

“(2) Unless, and only to the extent that, the articles or bylaws of the

corporation, or the governing instruments of a superior religious body or general

church of which the corporation is a member, so expressly provide . [¶] . . .

“(d) Trusts created by paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) may be amended or

dissolved by amendment from time to time to the articles, bylaws, or governing

instruments creating the trusts. . . .” (Italics added.)

This statute appears to be the type of statute the United States Supreme

Court had in mind when it approved reliance on “provisions of state statutory law

governing the holding of property by religious corporations . . . .” (Md. & Va.

Churches v. Sharpsburg Ch. , supra, 396 U.S. at p. 367, fn. omitted.) Justice

Brennan fleshed out the point in his concurring opinion in that case. He explained

that one possible approach to resolving church property disputes “is the passage of

special statutes governing church property arrangements in a manner that

precludes state interference in doctrine. Such statutes must be carefully drawn to

leave control of ecclesiastical polity, as well as doctrine, to church governing

bodies.” (Id. at p. 370 (conc. opn. of Brennan, J.).) Section 9142, subdivisions (c)

and (d), does not permit state interference in religious doctrine and leaves control

of ecclesiastical policy and doctrine to the church. Subdivision (c) of that section

permits the governing instruments of the general church to create an express trust

in church property, which Canon I.7.4 does. Subdivision (d) permits changing a

trust, but only if done in the instrument that created it. Canon I.7.4 has not been

amended. So it would appear that this statute also compels the conclusion that the

general church owns the property now that defendants have left the general

church.

25

Defendants argue that section 9142 states only a negative conditional, not a

positive imperative. In other words, in their view, the statutory provisions are

minimum requirements for impression of a trust on local religious property, and do

not necessarily exclude other requirements therefor. Defendants focus on the

grammatical construction of subdivision (c), and its repeated use of the word

“unless.” As defendants would have it, there is never a trust “unless” one of the

statutory provisions is present, but this does not mean there is always a trust when

one or more of the provisions is present. But this interpretation overlooks

subdivision (d) of section 9142. That subdivision provides that “[t]rusts created

by paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) may be amended or dissolved by amendment

from time to time to the articles, bylaws, or governing instruments creating the

trusts . . . .” (Italics added.) Thus, subdivision (d) appears clearly to indicate that,

under California law, a trust is created by compliance with any one of the

alternatives set forth in subdivision (c)(2), and it can only be altered or dissolved

by amending the creating instrument.

In short, St. James Parish agreed from the beginning of its existence to be

part of a greater denominational church and to be bound by that greater church’s

governing instruments. Those instruments make clear that a local parish owns

local church property in trust for the greater church and may use that property only

so long as the local church remains part of the greater church. Respect for the

First Amendment free exercise rights of persons to enter into a religious

association of their choice, as delineated in Jones v. Wolf, supra, 443 U.S. 595 (as

well as the provisions of section 9142) requires civil courts to give effect to the

provisions and agreements of that religious association. To adapt a similar

conclusion in a recent Court of Appeal decision involving a different religious

association, “In summary, [St. James Parish] is bound by the constitution, laws,

rules and regulations of the [Episcopal Church]. Historically, it has accepted the

26

authority of the national church and submitted itself to the national church’s

jurisdiction.” (Guardian Angel Polish Nat. Catholic Church of L.A., Inc. v.

Grotnik , supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 929; see also Korean United Presbyterian

Church v. Presbytery of the Pacific , supra, 230 Cal.App.3d 480 [reaching a

similar conclusion regarding a different religious association based in part on

section 9142 and a general church’s constitutional provision comparable to Canon

I.7.4].)

This conclusion is bolstered by a review of out-of-state cases that involved

similar church property disputes within the Episcopal Church and that, with near

unanimity, awarded the disputed property to the general church when a local

church disaffiliated itself from that general church. A typical case, and one cited

in some of the later cases, is Rector, Wardens v. Episcopal Church (Conn. 1993)

620 A.2d 1280. In that case, the court reviewed the history of the Episcopal

Church. It concluded that a local church that had withdrawn from the general

Episcopal Church, as well as the local church’s predecessors, “had agreed, as a

condition to their formation as ecclesiastical organizations affiliated with the

Diocese and [the Episcopal Church], to use and hold their property only for the

greater purposes of the church.” (Id. at p. 1292.) Specifically, it found that Canon

I.7.4 (which it called the “Dennis Canon”), “adopted in 1979 merely codified in

explicit terms a trust relationship that has been implicit in the relationship between

local parishes and dioceses since the founding of [the Episcopal Church] in 1789.”

(Ibid.) Accordingly, it found “a legally enforceable trust in favor of the general

church in the property claimed by the [local church].” (Id. at p. 1293.)

Other Episcopal Church cases reaching similar conclusions include Bishop

and Diocese of Colorado v. Mote (Colo. 1986) 716 P.2d 85; Episcopal Diocese of

Mass. v. Devine (Mass.App.Ct. 2003) 797 N.E.2d 916 (relying on Canon I.7.4 and

the fact the local church had agreed to accede to the general church’s canons);

27

Bennison v. Sharp (Mich.Ct.App. 1983) 329 N.W.2d 466; Protestant Episc.

Church, etc. v. Graves (N.J. 1980) 417 A.2d 19; The Diocese v. Trinity Epis.

Church (App.Div. 1999) 684 N.Y.S.2d 76, 81 (“[T]he ‘Dennis Canon’ amendment

expressly codifies a trust relationship which has implicitly existed between the

local parishes and their dioceses throughout the history of the Protestant Episcopal

Church,” citing Rector, Wardens v. Episcopal Church, supra, 620 A.2d 1280);

Daniel v. Wray (N.C.Ct.App. 2003) 580 S.E.2d 711 (relying on Canon I.7.4); In re

Church of St. James the Less (Pa. 2005) 888 A.2d 795 (relying on Canon I.7.4 and

citing Rector, Wardens v. Episcopal Church, supra, 620 A.2d 1280). The court in

Bjorkman v. Protestant Episcopal Church (Ky. 1988) 759 S.W.2d 583 awarded

the property to the local church, but there the dispute arose before the high court

decision of Jones v. Wolf, supra, 443 U.S. 595, the opinion did not mention Canon

I.7.4, and the decision has not been followed by other jurisdictions. These out-ofstate

decisions are not binding on this court, but we find them persuasive,

especially in the aggregate.

Defendants rely in part on Protestant Episcopal Church v. Barker, supra,

115 Cal.App.3d 599, the only reported California case involving a property

dispute within the Episcopal Church. In that case, four local churches in Los

Angeles disaffiliated from the general Episcopal Church. The Court of Appeal,

over a dissent, awarded the disputed property to three of the local churches and to

the general church regarding the fourth local church. The factual difference that

caused the different results was that the three churches were incorporated before,

and the fourth after, a particular canon of the Los Angeles Diocese was adopted.

The dissent would have awarded all of the disputed property to the general church.

We need not decide whether the majority decision was correct based on the

specific record before it and the state of the law at the time, for it is

distinguishable, largely due to the passage of time. In that case, the dispute arose

28

and, indeed, the trial court judgment was rendered before (1) the decision in Jones

v. Wolf , supra, 443 U.S. 595, (2) the Episcopal Church adopted Canon I.7.4, and

(3) the Legislature enacted section 9142, subdivisions (c) and (d). The appellate

court in Barker did not mention any of the general church’s canons. Accordingly,

that decision does not control a dispute that, here, arose 25 years after the high

court decision and the adoption of Canon I.7.4. We note that several of the out-ofstate

cases discussed above cite, but do not follow, Protestant Episcopal Church v.

Barker , supra, 115 Cal.App.3d 599. 8

Defendants also cite California-Nevada Annual Conf. of the United

Methodist Church v. St. Luke’s United Methodist Church , supra, 121 Cal.App.4th

754 (St. Luke’s), which interpreted section 9142. The court in that case concluded

that there had been a trust in favor of the general church, but that the deeds to the

local property and the local church’s articles of incorporation, not the general

church’s governing instruments, created the trust. (See St. Luke’s, supra, at p. 770

[“The Book of Discipline [i.e., the general church’s governing instrument] did not,

by itself, ‘create’ the trust.”].) Accordingly, it concluded that the local church

could, and did, revoke the trust. (Id. at p. 771.) We need not decide whether St.

Luke’s was correct on its facts because, assuming its conclusion was factually

correct, the decision is distinguishable. Here, the general church’s canons, not

instruments of the local church, created the trust. The language of section 9142,

subdivision (d), requires any revocation of that trust to exist in the document that

created it. So, assuming the local church in St. Luke’s may have been able to

8 See Bishop and Diocese of Colorado v. Mote, supra, 716 P.2d at pages

108-109; id., footnote 17 (“[W]e find the holding in Barker inapplicable and

decline to follow it”); Rector, Wardens v. Episcopal Church, supra, 620 A.2d at

page 1285 (“declin[ing] to follow” Barker); Episcopal Diocese of Mass. v. Devine,

supra , 797 N.E.2d at page 924, footnote 21; Bennison v. Sharp, supra, 329

N.W.2d at pages 473-474.

29

revoke the trust of that case, nothing in section 9142 or the governing instruments

of the Episcopal Church suggests that defendants may do so in this case.

The St. Luke’s court also stated that “subdivision (c)(2) of Corporations

Code section 9142 does not authorize a general church to create a trust interest for

itself in property owned by a local church simply by issuing a rule declaring that

such a trust exists . . . .” (St. Luke’s, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th 754, 757.) As a

general proposition, this statement is inconsistent with section 9142, subdivision

(c)(2)’s plain language, and we disapprove it. Instead, we agree with the

assessment of the Court of Appeal in this case: “[I]n a hierarchically organized

church, the ‘general church’ can impress a trust on a local religious corporation of

which the local corporation is a ‘member’ if the governing instruments of that

superior religious body so provide.”

Defendants argue that such a reading of section 9142 “would

unconstitutionally promote and establish denominational religion.” We need not,

indeed, cannot consider all possible applications of section 9142, but as applied

here, the section is fully consistent with Jones v. Wolf, supra, 443 U.S. at page

606, and promotes the free exercise rights of persons to form and join a religious

association that is constructed and governed as they choose. Defendants also

suggest that the Episcopal Church did not properly adopt Canon I.7.4 under its

own rules. It is a bit late to argue that Canon I.7.4 was not effectively adopted, a

quarter of a century later, and, in light of the consistent conclusions of the out-ofstate

cases that that canon is, indeed, part of the Episcopal Church’s governing

documents, the argument seems dubious at best. But, in any event, this is one of

those questions regarding “religious doctrine or polity” (or, as we phrased it in

Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court , supra, 32 Cal.4th at

page 541, “religious doctrine and internal church governance”) on which we must

defer to the greater church’s resolution. (Jones v. Wolf, supra, 443 U.S. at p. 602.)

30

Over the years, the Episcopal Church has consistently taken the position that

Canon I.7.4 was effectively adopted.

Defendants also rely on Evidence Code section 662, which provides, “The

owner of the legal title to property is presumed to be the owner of the full

beneficial title. This presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing

proof.” We need not decide how or whether this statute interacts with the more

specific section 9412 (or the First Amendment constraints that exist in this case),

because, as the Court of Appeal noted, “particularly when read in conjunction with

section 9142, canon I.7.4 is clear and convincing evidence rebutting any

presumption that the beneficial interest in the local church property is solely

controlled by the local parish corporation.”

Defendants state that, over the years, St. James Parish “purchased

additional parcels of property in its own name, with funds donated exclusively by

its members.” They contend that it would be unjust and contrary to the intent of

the members who, they argue, “acquired, built, improved, maintained, repaired,

cared for and used the real and personal property at issue for over fifty years,” to

cause the local parish to “los[e] its property simply because it has changed its

spiritual affiliation.” But the matter is not so clear. We may assume that St.

James Parish’s members did what defendants say they did for all this time. But

they did it for a local church that was a constituent member of a greater church and

that promised to remain so. Did they act over the years intending to contribute to

a church that was part of the Episcopal Church or to contribute to St. James Parish

even if it later joined a different church? It is impossible to say for sure. Probably

different contributors over the years would have had different answers if they had

thought about it and were asked. The only intent a secular court can effectively

discern is that expressed in legally cognizable documents. In this case, those

31

documents show that the local church agreed and intended to be part of a larger

entity and to be bound by the rules and governing documents of that greater entity.

For these reasons, we agree with the Court of Appeal’s conclusion

(although not with all of its reasoning) that when defendants disaffiliated from the

Episcopal Church, the local church property reverted to the general church. As

stated in one of the out-of-state cases involving the same Episcopal

Church, “[t]he individual defendants are free to disassociate themselves from [the

parish and the Episcopal Church] and to affiliate themselves with another religious

denomination. No court can interfere with or control such an exercise of

conscience. The problem lies in defendants’ efforts to take the church property

with them. This they may not do.” (Protestant Episc. Church, etc. v. Graves,

supra , 417 A.2d at p. 25.)

III. C ONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

CHIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

GEORGE, C.J.

BAXTER, J.

WERDEGAR, J.

MORENO, J.

CORRIGAN, J.

1

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J.

I agree with the majority that the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United

States of America (Episcopal Church) owns the property to which St. James Parish

in Newport Beach (St. James Parish) has held title since 1950. This conclusion is

compelled by Corporations Code section 9142, subdivision (c)(2). But I disagree

with the majority that this provision, which applies only to religious corporations,

reflects a “neutral principles of law” approach.

I

St. James Parish began in 1947 as a mission of the Episcopal Church. In

1949, it incorporated and became a parish of the Episcopal Church. Since 1950,

the parish has held the deed to the property on which the parish’s church building

stands. Ownership of the property is at issue here.

In 1979, the Episcopal Church added section 4 to its Canon I.7 to provide

that all property held by any of its parishes is held in trust for the Episcopal

Church. In 2004, St. James Parish ended its affiliation with the Episcopal Church,

and it amended its articles of incorporation to delete any reference to the Episcopal

Church.

Thereafter, the Episcopal Church, its Los Angeles Diocese, and a

congregation member who voted against the decision of the parish to disaffiliate

brought these actions, asserting that the property at issue was being held in trust

for the Episcopal Church. The trial court ruled for St. James Parish; the Court of

Appeal reversed. This court granted review.

2

II

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to

the states through the Fourteenth Amendment (Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310

U.S. 296, 303-304), states: “Congress shall make no law respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” Because of

the risks of inhibiting the free development of religion and entangling secular

interests in ecclesiastical concerns, the “First Amendment severely circumscribes

the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes.”

(Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church (1969) 393 U.S. 440, 449.) In this regard,

the United States Supreme Court has identified two constitutionally permissible

approaches that civil courts may use when called upon to resolve disputes relating

to church property.

One is the “principle of government” approach: When the dispute involves

a hierarchical church, as here the Episcopal Church, civil courts must accept

decisions made at the highest level of the church hierarchy. (Watson v. Jones

(1871) 80 U.S. 679, 727.)

The other is the “neutral principles of law” approach. That concept, as used

in the context of a civil court’s resolution of church property disputes, simply

permits application of “objective, well-established concepts of trust and property

law familiar to lawyers and judges.” (Jones v. Wolf (1979) 443 U.S. 595, 603.)

These are “principles or rules of law ‘developed for use in all property disputes’

whether or not the litigants are religious associations or corporations.”

(Presbytery of Riverside v. Community Church of Palm Springs (1979) 89

Cal.App.3d 910, 923, fn. 2.)

The United States Supreme Court has left it to the states to decide which

approach to adopt. (Jones v. Wolf, supra, 443 U.S. at p. 602.)

In 1982, the California Legislature amended Corporations Code section

9142 by adding, as relevant here, subdivision (c)(2). That provision permits the

assets of a religious corporation to be made subject to a trust when “the articles or

3

bylaws of the corporation, or the governing instruments of a superior religious

body or general church of which the corporation is a member, so expressly

provide.” Thus, as the majority notes (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 23-24), through

legislative fiat a “superior religious body or general church” may unilaterally

create trusts in its favor over property held by the smaller church that was a

member of the general church when the trust was created. That occurred here

when in 1979 the Episcopal Church added section 4 to its Canon I.7 to unilaterally

provide that all property held by any parish is held in trust for the Episcopal

Church.

Applying California’s statute in resolving church property disputes, the

majority concludes that the Episcopal Church now is the owner of the St. James

Parish property in question. I agree.

But that conclusion is not based on neutral principles of law. 1 No principle

of trust law exists that would allow the unilateral creation of a trust by the

declaration of a nonowner of property that the owner of the property is holding it

in trust for the nonowner. (California-Nevada Annual Conf. of the United

Methodist Church v. St. Luke’s United Methodist Church (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th

754, 769.) If a neutral principle of law approach were applied here, the Episcopal

Church might well lose because the 1950 deed to the disputed property is in the

name of St. James Parish, 2 and the Episcopal Church’s 1979 declaration that the

parish was holding the property in trust for the Episcopal Church is of no legal

consequence.

1 In footnote 4, page 13, the majority asserts that neutral principles of law

“include application of statutes specifically governing religious property.” I

disagree. In the United States Supreme Court’s usage, neutral principles of law

refer to laws that apply in the same way regardless of whether property is church

property. (Jones v. Wolf, supra, 443 U.S. at p. 603 [The neutral-principles

approach “relies exclusively on objective, well-established concepts of trust and

property law familiar to lawyers and judges”].)

2 “The owner of the legal title to property is presumed to be the owner of the

full beneficial title.” (Evid. Code, § 662.)

4

But under the principle of government approach, the Episcopal Church

wins because that method makes the decision of the highest authority of a

hierarchical church, here the Episcopal Church, binding on a civil court. This

result is constitutional, but only because the dispute involves religious bodies and

then only because the principle of government approach, permissible under the

First Amendment, allows a state to give unbridled deference to the superior

religious body or general church.

In my view, Corporations Code section 9142 reflects the principle of

government approach. That statute allows a hierarchical church, such as the

Episcopal Church here, through its bylaws to unilaterally impose a trust on the

property of a local member parish. The statute does not state a neutral principle of

law; rather, it creates a special principle applicable solely to religious corporations.

KENNARD, J.

See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Episcopal Church Cases

__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted XXX 152 Cal.App.4th 808

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S155094

Date Filed: January 5, 2009

__________________________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: Orange

Judge: David C. Velasquez

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Holme Roberts & Owen, John R. Shiner, Brent E. Rychener; Horvitz & Levy, Frederic D. Cohen and

Jeremy B. Rosen for Plaintiffs and Appellants Jane Hyde Rasmussen, The Right Rev. Robert M. Anderson,

The Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Los Angeles and The Right Rev. J. Jon Bruno, Bishop

Diocesan of the Episcopal Diocese of Los Angeles.

Law Offices of George S. Burns, George S. Burns, Kathryn M. Schwertfeger and John C. Ashby for the

Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), the Synod of Southern California and Hawaii and the Presbytery of Hanmi

as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants Jane Hyde Rasmussen, The Right Rev. Robert M.

Anderson, The Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Los Angeles and The Right Rev. J. Jon

Bruno, Bishop Diocesan of the Episcopal Diocese of Los Angeles.

Goodwin Procter, David Booth Beers, Heather H. Anderson, Jeffrey David Skinner and Matthew J.

Wilshire for Intervener and Appellant The Episcopal Church.

Weil, Gotshal & Manges, Christopher J. Cox and Douglas E. Lumish for Clifton Kirkpatrick, Joey Mills,

Katherine J. Runyeon, Rev. Joseph Lee, Elder John Lococo, General Council on Finance and

Administration of the United Methodist Church, Wesley Granberg-Michaelson, General Conference of the

Seventh-day Adventists, Christian and Missionary Alliance, International Church of the Foursquare Gospel

and Worldwide Church of God as Amici Curiae on behalf of Intervener and Appellant The Episcopal

Church.

Law Offices of Tony J. Tanke and Tony J. Tanke for Holy Apostolic Catholic Assyrian Church of the East

as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Intervener and Appellant The Episcopal Church.

Page 2 – S155094 - counsel continued

Attorneys for Respondent:

Payne & Fears, Eric C. Sohlgren, Benjamin A. Nix, Daniel F. Lula; Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland and

Robert A. Olson for Defendants and Respondents Rev. Praveen Bunyan, Rev. Richard A. Menees, Rev. M.

Kathleen Adams, The Rector, Wardens and Vestrymen of St. James Parish in Newport Beach, California,

James Dale, Barbara Hettinga, Paul Stanley, Cal Trent, John McLaughlin, Penny Reveley, Mike

Thompson, Jill Austin, Eric Evans, Frank Daniels, Cobb Grantham and Julia Houten.

Lu T. Nguyen for The Charismatic Episcopal Church as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and

Respondents Rev. Praveen Bunyan, Rev. Richard A. Menees, Rev. M. Kathleen Adams, The Rector,

Wardens and Vestrymen of St. James Parish in Newport Beach, California, James Dale, Barbara Hettinga,

Paul Stanley, Cal Trent, John McLaughlin, Penny Reveley, Mike Thompson, Jill Austin, Eric Evans, Frank

Daniels, Cobb Grantham and Julia Houten.

Law Offices of Lynn E. Moyer, Lynn E. Moyer; Law Office of Kent M. Bridwell and Kent M. Bridwell for

Rev. Jose Poch et al., and Rev. William A. Thompson et al., as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and

Respondents Rev. Praveen Bunyan, Rev. Richard A. Menees, Rev. M. Kathleen Adams, The Rector,

Wardens and Vestrymen of St. James Parish in Newport Beach, California, James Dale, Barbara Hettinga,

Paul Stanley, Cal Trent, John McLaughlin, Penny Reveley, Mike Thompson, Jill Austin, Eric Evans, Frank

Daniels, Cobb Grantham and Julia Houten.

Law Offices of Penner, Bradley & Buettner, Randall M. Penner; Mayer Brown, Donald Falk and Eugene

Volokh for The Presbyterian Lay Committee as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents

Rev. Praveen Bunyan, Rev. Richard A. Menees, Rev. M. Kathleen Adams, The Rector, Wardens and

Vestrymen of St. James Parish in Newport Beach, California, James Dale, Barbara Hettinga, Paul Stanley,

Cal Trent, John McLaughlin, Penny Reveley, Mike Thompson, Jill Austin, Eric Evans, Frank Daniels,

Cobb Grantham and Julia Houten.

Kenneth W. Starr; and Robert F. Cochran, Jr., for Iglesia Evangelica Latina, Inc., Juan A. Reyes, Aida

Haydee Reyes, Ahuner Portillo, Audias J. Portillo, Baldemar Contreras, Benjamin Carranza, Camilo

Encina, Christian Sical, Edwin Perez, Edwing Morales, Enrique Luna, Esbin Portillo, Beltran Fermin,

Francisco Fuentes, Carlos G. Garcia, Henry Portillo, Jose Campos, Jose Alfredo Jiminez, Misael Portillo,

Nelson Sosa, Noe Carias, Roberto Estrada, Jonathan Evangelista, Saul Cifuentes, Victor Jacobo, Bildad

Coin, Jose Ruben Reyes, Alex Reyes, Jose Antonio Menjivar, Amado Morroquin, Epifanio Zepeda and

Jose Luz Araujo as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents Rev. Praveen Bunyan, Rev.

Richard A. Menees, Rev. M. Kathleen Adams, The Rector, Wardens and Vestrymen of St. James Parish in

Newport Beach, California, James Dale, Barbara Hettinga, Paul Stanley, Cal Trent, John McLaughlin,

Penny Reveley, Mike Thompson, Jill Austin, Eric Evans, Frank Daniels, Cobb Grantham and Julia Houten.

Wild, Carter & Tipton and Russell G. Vanrozeboom for The Diocese of San Joaquin as Amicus Curiae on

behalf of Defendants and Respondents Rev. Praveen Bunyan, Rev. Richard A. Menees, Rev. M. Kathleen

Adams, The Rector, Wardens and Vestrymen of St. James Parish in Newport Beach, California, James

Dale, Barbara Hettinga, Paul Stanley, Cal Trent, John McLaughlin, Penny Reveley, Mike Thompson, Jill

Austin, Eric Evans, Frank Daniels, Cobb Grantham and Julia Houten.

Allan E. Wilion for Thomas Lee and Rev. Peter Min as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and

Respondents Rev. Praveen Bunyan, Rev. Richard A. Menees, Rev. M. Kathleen Adams, The Rector,

Wardens and Vestrymen of St. James Parish in Newport Beach, California, James Dale, Barbara Hettinga,

Paul Stanley, Cal Trent, John McLaughlin, Penny Reveley, Mike Thompson, Jill Austin, Eric Evans, Frank

Daniels, Cobb Grantham and Julia Houten.

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

John R. Shiner

Holme Roberts & Owen

777 Figueroa Street, Suite 2800

Los Angeles, CA 90017-5826

(213) 572-4300

Heather H. Anderson

Goodwin Procter

901 New York Avenue

Washington, D.C. 20001

(202) 346-4000

Eric C. Sohlgren

Payne & Fears

4 Park Plaza, Suite 1100

Irvine, CA 92614

(949) 851-1100

PAGEANT 2008!

PAGEANT 2008!

Written & Directed by Suzanne Holder

with assistance from:

Richard Seymour

Cassandra Kirby

Ron Harrington

Ruth Shankwiler

Michael Smith

 

 

MAMAS PASADENA AWARDS CEREMONY

 

November 1st, 2008 Mamas Pasadena, a new initiative of Episcopal Economic Development, hosted an Awards Ceremony for those instrumental in the establishment of this new Pasadena institution.

Presiding at the ceremony were Diocesan Bishop J. Jon Bruno, Pasadena Mayor Bill Bogaard, and the Director of Episcopal Economic Development.

Honored were Howard, Nan and Melanie Schow who have given quite significant impetus to this endeavor, and St. Edmund's Episcopal Church and Mission & Outreach Committee.

The facility is located on San Gabriel Boulevard just North of Colorado on the West side of the street and will soon be serving lunch.

A training facility, it will provide business education and culinary arts education to aspiring entrepreneurs in need of mentors, training, and a monitored health approved facility. 

PARISH ORGAN DEDICATION the Feast of Saint Edmund

ORGAN RECITAL with STEPHEN THARP Feast of All Saints'